Richard Rufus's De anima Commentary: The Earliest Known, Surviving, Western De anima Commentary by Wood, Rega
RICHARD RUF US’S DE ANIMA COMMENTA RY
Richard Rufus’s De anima Commentary:





Richard Rufus of Cornwall was educated as a philosopher at Paris where he
was a master of arts.1 In 1238, after lecturing on Aristotle’s libri naturales,
Rufus became a Franciscan and moved to Oxford to study theology, becom-
ing the Franciscan master of theology in about 1256 and probably dying not
long after 1259.2
Rufus’s conversion to Franciscanism was marked by a desire to distance
himself from Aristotle and other wordly philosophers. As a Franciscan,
Rufus to some extent repudiated his own earlier views; occasionally he
referred to them as the opinions of a “secular master.” In his later career,
Rufus used the technical terminology of philosophy sparingly — preferring
not to use phrases like ‘agent intellect’ or ‘intellectus adeptus’. And even
before Rufus became a Franciscan, he gave an increasingly sympathetic
hearing to non-Aristotelian and Platonic views, as is plain from his Contra
Averroem (CAv).3 As a Franciscan, Rufus twice lectured on Peter Lombard’s
Sentences, first at Oxford in about 1250 where he was the first bachelor of
theology to lecture there on Lombard, and then at Paris.4
Rufus’s philosophical works are preserved at Erfurt, in two codices
purchased by Amplonius de Berka in about 1400: Quarto 290 and Quarto
The National Endowment for the Humanities has generously underwritten the
publication Rufus’s De anima commentary. The edition will be prepared in
2002–2003 and will appear in the Stanford edition of Rufus’s works.
1. Thomas Eccleston, De adventu Fratrum minorum in Angliam c. 6 (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1951), p. 30.
2. A. Little, “The Franciscan School at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century,”
Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 19 (1926): 842–45. Wills and Inventories, Surtees
Society Publications 2 (London: J.B. Nichols, 1835), pp. 10–11. Cf. A. Little, The Grey
Friars in Oxford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), p. 143.
3. Rufus, Contra Averroem 1.6: “Quid ergo verius videtur quam opinio Platonica
ponens universalia ideas esse” (Erfurt Quarto 312.82va). Hereafter CAv, Q312.
4. F. Pelster, “Der älteste Sentenzenkommentar aus der Oxforder Franzis-
kanerschule,” Scholastik 1 (1926): 50–80.
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312.5 As bound by Amplonius, Erfurt Quarto 312 begins with Rufus’s Physics
(fol. 1–14vra) and De generatione et corruptione (fol. 14ra–19ra) commentar-
ies, followed on folios 29va–32vb by his commentary on the Posterior ana-
lytics. In between, on folios 19rb–28vb, there is a De anima commentary,
which also turns out to be by Rufus. In Spring 2000, before I finished
transcribing the commentary from Erfurt Quarto 312, I found that another
version of it had already been published.6 Manuel Alonso, S.J., published
most of books 2 and 3 as a work by Peter of Spain, later Pope John XXI.6
Since Erfurt Quarto 312, folios 19rb–28vb, includes book 1 as well as books
2 and 3, in one sense it is more complete. The Madrid manuscript is more
complete in another sense though, as it includes literal exposition as well
as questions and divisions of the text. Though lacking the literal exposition
of books 2 and 3, Erfurt Quarto 312 (Q312) does include a literal exposition
of book 1.7
Alonso’s attribution of the work to Peter of Spain was rejected on good
grounds by R. Gauthier in his preface to the Leonine edition of St. Thomas’s
De anima commentary. Alonso ascribed the work to Peter of Spain chiefly be-
cause the manuscript in which it is found, Madrid B. National 3314, was or-
ganized by the same scribe responsible for the Madrid (BN 1877) manuscript
of Peter’s medical works. But as Gauthier points out, a number of the other
works in Madrid BN 3314 are not by Peter of Spain, but by Grosseteste, Ba-
con, and Buckfield.7 And since the doctrine differs somewhat from Peter’s,
there’s no particular reason to believe the work is by him.8
5. Only three minor philosophical work are missing from the collection,
Rufus’s De intellectu divino (Assisi 138, 262va–263ra), his De mutatione (Toulouse 737,
258ra–va) and his De rationibus seminalibus (Toulouse 737, 258va–160vb), all of
which are preserved only in Franciscan miscellanies.
6. Petrus Hispanus (Pedro Hispano), Obras Filosoficas III, ed. Manuel Alonso,
S.J. (Madrid: Istituto de filosofia “Luis Vives,” 1952), pp. 120–401. Henceforth MA.
The difference between the two versions of the De anima commentary parallels
the differences between the redactions of Rufus’s mature Metaphysics commentary
(DMet). In both cases, the Erfurt redactions lack straight textual exposition and are
comprised chiefly of short questions and notes on problems raised by the text. The
Erfurt De anima, unlike Erfurt DMet, also includes an opening paragraph outlining
the text, a series of divisions in which the first member but not the second member
is further divided. Omitted in Erfurt DMet, these divisions also appear in Rufus’s
Erfurt Physics commentary, which like the Erfurt De anima includes these divisions
as well as lemmata, questions and notes. As in the case of DMet, the two redactions
are close enough to be collated. Deliberate changes have been made, however, most
noticeably in introductory and transitional wording; a retro reference has been
adjusted. How the two versions are related requires further study.
7. Oddly this literal version appears at the end of book I; it is not integrated
with the notes and questions. It is written in a slightly different hand, but that
probably does not indicate a change in author or a different work. Such changes
are quite common in the works by Rufus preserved at Erfurt; DMet for example was
copied by a number of slightly different hands.
8. Aquinas, Sententia Libri De Anima (Sent. DAn), ed. R. Gauthier, Opera Omnia
Iussu Leonis (OO) 45.1: 236*–237*; Cf. J. M. da Cruz Pontes, “A propos d’un
120 REGA WOOD
Why do I think this commentary is by Rufus? For five reasons: manu-
script location, genre, citation form, self-reference, and doctrine.9 Probably
no single reason would be sufficient by itself, since Rufus shares both
stylistic devices and views with his contemporaries, particularly those whom
he influenced, such as Roger Bacon and Robert Kilwardby,10 and the author
of the anonymous commentary on De anima edited by R. Gauthier.11 Taken
together, however, doctrine, self-reference, and style paint a picture of the
same author using the same tools.
First, in a class by itself, is the circa 1240 manuscript where the De anima
commentary appears, Erfurt Quarto 312. This manuscript includes a
centenaire. Une nouvelle monographie sur Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis, le pape
Jean XXI (1 1277) est-elle nécessaire?” RTAM 44 (1977): 229.
9. In an article received just before proofs were prepared, Josef Brams makes
an important contribution to the study of the relation between the Erfurt and
Madrid redactions of the De anima commentary, and he announces another manu-
script of the work: Florence BN Conv. soppr. G.4.853 fol. 193ra-22va, discovered by
J. De Raedemaeker. Like Raedemaeker, Brams suggests that the author of the
commentary may be a certain Alexander: Master Alexander or Alexander the Great.
As Brams notes, this suggestion was rejected earlier by Victorin Doucet who indi-
cated that the Florentine attribution was not written in a coeval hand. Not having
seen the ascription I cannot judge its date. But I note that the evidence for the
attribution to Richard Rufus is very strong, and neither Alexander of Hales, nor
Alexander of Alexandria is a plausible candidate. One is too early and knew too
little Aristotle, and the other flourished decades after the Erfurt manuscript was
written. Bram’s article, “Le premier commentaire médiéval sur le Traite de l’ame
d’Aristote?,” is forthcoming in Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales.
10. R. Wood, “Roger Bacon: Richard Rufus’s Successor as a Parisian Physics
Professor,” Vivarium 35 (1997): 222–50; Kilwardby’s case is more complicated, since
commentaries by Kilwardby on the works Rufus taught as an arts master do not
survive. However, Kilwardby’s career as an arts master probably overlapped with
those of both Rufus and Bacon. And where there are parallels between the proem
of Rufus’s Physics commentary and Kilwardby’s De ortu scientiarum, there are signs of
the influence. Like Rufus, Kilwardby holds that the mechanical arts exist to supply
human defects (In Phys. P6. Q312,1ra–rb; De ortu 37.58, p. 127). Kilwardby cites and
refutes Rufus’s views on the role of medicine (In Phys. P11, Q312.1va, De ortu 10.57,
p. 27), and he uses language close to Rufus’s when dividing natural science (In Phys.
P8, Q312.1va, De ortu 5.15, p. 14). Cf. Kilwardby, De ortu scientiarum, ed. A. Judy,
London 1976. The intricacies of their relationship as theologians I have described
in “Early Oxford Theology,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences,
ed. G. R. Evans, (Leiden: Brill, 2001).
11. Here the extent of Rufus’s influence can be compared with that of other
contemporaries. In his magnificent edition, Gauthier has listed nine parallel texts
from Bacon and seventy from Rufus. That is quite an astonishing number when
compared with the fifteen parallel texts Gauthier found in Rome’s closest con-
temporary, the author of the anonymous commentary preserved in Oxford, Bodl.
Lat. Misc C70 and Rome, Bibl. Naz. 5.E.828. See Anonymus Magister Artium
(1245–1250), Lectura in librum de anima a quodam discipulo reportata (M.s. Roma Naz.
V. E. 828) 1.8, ed. R. Gauthier, (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras
Aquas, 1985). Henceforth Anon., In DAn, ed. R. Gauthier.
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number of unattributed works from what I have called “The Ave Maria
Aristotle Quires.”12 So far in every case where the author of these works has
been identified, it has been Rufus. The De anima commentary (In DAn) is
most closely related in the manuscript to three other works by Rufus: his
commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics (In Phys.), De generatione et corruptione (In
DGen), and Analytica posteriora (In APos). Rufus’s Physics commentary ap-
pears in what were at one time, quires 49–50; his commentary on De
Generatione et corruptione on quires 50–51; the new De anima commentary on
quires 51–52, where it begins a new column, but not a new page. Rufus’s In
APos begins on quire 52 and would probably have been completed on quire
53, which has been lost. The Erfurt scribes made some effort to begin new
works on a new column; so the beginning of In De Generatione et corruptione
on line 11 of folio 14ra was probably a disappointment. Sometimes new
books of the same work also start on a fresh column—viz., In DAn 2 and 3.
In the original colophons, the word “Explicit” appears alone; there is no
scribal indication of a change of author.13
Second, there’s the form of the commentary, brief divisions of the
text followed by questions varying in length from five lines to five pages.
The wording and style of the divisions closely resembles those in Rufus’s
other early commentaries. Rufus quite frequently sees Aristotle making a
transition from what is principally intended to a consideration of its well
being — bene esse — or vice versa.14 Questions appear singly and in unre-
lated groups. Questions on a given text about unrelated topics are grouped
together, and the answers are not presented until after all the questions
have been stated; another example of this unusual practice is Rufus’s
Posterior analytics commentary.15
12. Cf. “Richard Rufus’s Speculum animae: Epistemology and the Introduction
of Aristotle in the West,” in Die Bibliotheca Amploniana im Spannungsfeld von Aris-
totelismus, Nominalismus und Humanismus, ed. A. Speer (Miscellanea Mediaevalia
23), (Berlin: 1995), pp. 86–109. See also the introduction to Rufus, In Phys. (forth-
coming).
13. De anima itself has no contemporary explicit. Space was left deliberately
left blank on the column and in the signature. So the work is probably incomplete,
though not much is missing; the last words pertain to Aristotle, DAn 3.12.434a22.
14. Rufus, In DAn 1: “Prior pars adhuc dividitur in duas, quarum prima est de
esse principaliter intentorum, secunda de bene esse intentionis suae” (Q312.19rb).
Rufus, In Anal. pos (In APos) 1: “Liber iste dividitur in duas partes in quarum
prima determinat principale intentum; in secunda, quandam quaestionem conse-
quentem, ibi: “De principiis,” et illa pars est de bene esse huius doctrinae tanquam
consequens ad principale” (Q312.29va). Italics here and hereafter indicate empha-
sis.
Rufus, Dissertatio in Metaph. Aristot. (DMet) 1: “Iste autem liber primo dividitur
in duas partes. In prima ponit quoddam capitulum quod est ad bene esse doctrinae et
a bonitate doctoris, in secunda aggreditur quod intendit principaliter in hoc libro”
(Vat. lat. 4538.2vb).
15. R. Wood and R. Andrews, “Causality and Demonstration: An Early Scholas-
tic Posterior analytics commentary,” The Monist 79 (1996): 325–56.
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Third, reference to Aristotle resembles Rufus’s other philosophical
works. According to this early commentary convention,16 Aristotle is con-
trasted with ‘the Commentator’ (Averroes) as the ‘author’ or as ‘Aristotle’
and not as ‘the Philosopher’.17 Other authors of the period, including
Roger Bacon, also follow this practice. It is not, however, general practice.
Much earlier, Philip the Chancellor began to refer to Aristotle as ‘the
Philosopher’.18 Rufus does this in 1250, but not before 1238.
Fourth, there is at least one reference from Rufus’s Oxford theology
lectures to this De anima commentary. It is a characteristic but potentially
misleading reference to his earlier views. Such citations are familiar in the
case of his second Metaphysics commentary (Dissertatio in Metaph. [DMet]).
Like his commentary on De anima, this commentary survives in two redac-
tions, and the version found at Erfurt is comprised mostly of notes and
questions. As a Franciscan, Rufus sometimes cites his philosophical works
by telling us (disapprovingly) what “the philosophers” think. Such citations
in his Oxford Sentences Commentary (SOx) made the authenticity of DMet
controversial for many years. First to see these references, Gedeon Gál
concluded that DMet could not be by Rufus.19 Timothy Noone, however, was
able to prove that the work was by Rufus.20
We have since come to recognize critical self-reference as characteristic
of Rufus, as for example in his discussions of the eternity of the world where
SOx criticizes DMet, which in turn criticizes the Physics commentary.21 Dis-
tancing himself from his earlier secular works is a special case — the phrase
“philosophi saeculares” apparently refers only to Rufus.22 By contrast, in
SOx, reference to “philosophi” may refer to Averroes, but it is just as likely
to refer to Rufus himself. So it is exciting to have a reference to the
“philosophi,” which cannot refer to Averroes and does refer to the opinion
Rufus states in his De anima commentary.
16. For the pairing of auctor and commentator, see also Anon., In DAn, ed. R.
Gauthier, p. 98.
17. Rufus, In DAn. 1, Q312.19va; In DAn. 2.1, Q312.22va; In DAn 3.3.3,
Q312.27va; In DAn. 3.8.2, Q312.28rb; In APos 1, Q312.30rb; In DGen. 1.1.6,
Q312.14rb; In Phys. 1.5.3, Q312.2va.
18. N. Wicki found sixty instances of the use, see Philippus C., Summa de bono,
(Berne: Editiones Franke, 1985), p. 45*.
19. G. Gál, “Commentarius in Metaphysicam Aristotelis cod. Vat. lat. 4538,
fons doctrinae Richardi Rufi,” Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 43 (1952):
209–42.
Gál subsequently changed his mind, see “Opiniones Richardi Rufi a Censore
Reprobatae,” p. 137 n.6 and “Richard Rufus of Cornwall,” New Catholic Encyclopedia
12:482.
20. T. Noone, “An Edition and Study of the Scriptum super Metaphysicam, bk. 12,
dist. 2: A Work Attributed to Richard Rufus of Cornwall,” (Ph.D. diss., University of
Toronto, 1987).
21. R. Wood, “Richard Rufus on Creation: The Reception of Aristotelian
Physics in the West.” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 2 (1992): 1–30.
22. G. Gál, “Commentarius,” pp. 214–15.
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In his Oxford theology lectures, Rufus compares the view of the phi-
losophers with those of the theologians on the question whether the intel-
lective, sensitive, and vegetative souls differ substantially. The philosophers
answer in the affirmative; the theologians in the negative.23 Rufus himself
then offers a third compromise view.
In his De anima commentary, Rufus maintains what he later describes
as the philosophers’ view: the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective souls are
essentially and substantially different prior to their union, yet they evolve
into a single substance. The vegetative and sensitive soul comprise a poten-
tial entity that is perfected by the intellective soul.24
The view we meet here was hotly controverted. As Rufus indicates in
SOx, contemporary theologians rejected it. That is true of Ioannes de
Rupella and Albertus Magnus, for example.25 The “philosophers” who
agree that initially the three souls are not substantially the same explain this
in different ways. Most commonly quoted and probably the first to try to
reconcile Aristotle with Augustine on this point was the theologian, Philip
the Chancellor. Philip held that the three substantial souls formed a single
soul but were not completely unified. Constituting a quasi unum with the
form of the intellective soul, human vegetative and sensitive souls are quasi
material rather than completing forms. Philip’s analogy is of one light with
two sources.26
By contrast, in his De anima commentary Rufus sees the sensitive soul
as completing the vegetative soul. In one sense they are substantially differ-
ent souls, but when united the perfecting form and its subordinated incom-
plete forms comprise a single substance or essence. Rufus specifically claims
that the human vegetative soul is in potential to the sensitive soul, which in
turn is in potential to the intellective soul. Rufus speaks of the yielding or
evolution of vegetative and sensitive souls into intellective souls, using the
same language he uses in his Physics commentary to describes the evolution
of specific forms from generic forms.27
23. Rufus, Sententia Oxoniensis (SOx) 2.17: “Quid in his dicam? Philosophi
dicunt quod sunt tres substantiae, sed una anima in homine, scilicet quod vegetativa
est possibilis respectu sensitivae, et haec respectu intellectivae. Illa autem est per-
fectio, et anima nomen est perfectionis. Unde definitur a Philosopho: Anima est
actus corporis etc.” (Balliol College 62.145va). Hereafter SOx, B62.
24. Rufus, In DAn 1.5: “His igitur rationibus apparet quod anima intellectiva
sit alia in substantia ab anima vegetativa et sensitiva exsistentibus in homine—quas
concedimus.
“Et dicemus quod cum fuerint tres animae secundum essentiam differentes,
uniuntur ad invicem et cedunt in unam substantiam animae per hoc quod anima
vegetativa et sensitiva sunt ut ens in potentia respectu animae intellectivae quae est
ut actus respectu illorum, quia cedunt in unam substantiam animae quae est
hominis perfectio” (Q312.20rb).
25. Rupella, Summa de anima 2.37, ed. T. Domenichelli, pp. 135–38. Albert,
Summa de creaturis 2.7, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris: Ludovicum Vivès, 1895), pp. 89–91.
26. Philippus C., Summa de bono (Berne: Editiones Franke, 1985), pp. 233–34.
27. Rufus, In Phys. 7.2.4: “Ita est ex hac parte quod aliqua duo diversa secun-
dum essentiam sunt eadem secundum essentiam cum aliquo uno incompleto, inter
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SOx cites just this view, making the comparison of the different souls to
the differentia of a genus. But then Rufus worries that in such cases, unlike
the specially created intellective soul, all differentia have an internal origin.28
After stigmatizing it as the philosopher’s opinion, Rufus then somewhat
oversimplifies the position as the claim that there are three substances in the
soul, without adding they evolve into a single substance. But then he supports
the claim by describing their evolution into a single substance: the vegetative
soul is in potential to the sensitive soul, which is in potential to the intellective
soul. After citing his own favorite Aristotelian authority, DAn 2.1.412b5,29
Rufus cites the Pseudo Aristotelian De plantis in the next paragraph. The fol-
lowing two paragraphs are a very close paraphrase of the views of Philip the
Chancellor, including his reference to the quasi materia, followed by a para-
graph devoted to Philip’s chosen example, a double-sourced light ray.
So in this instance what is introduced as the “philosopher’s opinion”
turns out to be a statement not of one view but two: Rufus’s own introduced
with the words “the philosophers say,” immediately followed by that of a
prominent older, authority, the theologian, Philip the Chancellor. Rufus’s
own view probably had its proponents, but it was not common. Roger Bacon
takes Philip’s position in a different direction and makes explicit the claim
that the soul is a form-matter composite, not troubling with Philip’s “quasi
materialis” qualification.30 For Rufus, by contrast, it would be misleading to
describe the human soul, as a form-matter composite, since it is a form. It
is not simple in the sense that it is a form without matter, but then, for
Rufus, no form lacks matter except God. For Rufus, what is united here is
a form in active potential with its completing form; it would be wrong to call
it a form-matter composite except in a carefully qualified sense.31 So for
their contemporaries from about 1240 to 1260, Rufus and Bacon were the
alternatives: the union of completing forms with forms in active potential
or form-matter composition.
At least one author pretty clearly aligns himself with Bacon. Peter of
Spain holds that there is unity in the soul, but it is not substantial; his
analogy is with combined lights from different sources.32
se tamen diversa. Hoc non est mirum, supposita hac propositione, quod essentia
incompleta—quod est genus—cedit in diversas essentias, sicut punctus cedit in
diversa puncta” (Q312.11vb).
28. Rufus, Sententia Oxoniensis 2.17: “Quod si ita esset, respondetur de facili in
hac quaestione, sicut universaliter de genere et differentia, scilicet quod sunt una
natura in actu et duae in potentia. Sed adhuc obstaret unum, numquam invenitur
quod genus veniat ab intrinseco, et differentia ab extrinseco, nec econtrario. Sed
semper per unam viam procedunt ad esse. Ergo nisi et sensitiva veniat ab extrinseo
sicut et rationalis, non erit una genus ad alteram” (B62.145rb).
29. See section I.3, below, num. 7.
30. Bacon, Quaestiones in librum de causis, ed. F. Delorme and R. Steele, OHI
12:158.
31. E. Karger, “Richard Rufus’s Account of Substantial Transmutation,” forth-
coming in Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale.
32. Petrus H., Comentario al “De anima,” ed. M. Alonso, Obras filosóficas
2:656–59.
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More often, authors try to have it both ways. Adam Buckfield, for
example, explains the unity of the soul both in terms of matter and form
and in terms of prior and posterior forms. He states the analogy of a light
with two sources, but then says that perhaps a better analogy is of a light
with both splendor and heat, a traditional simile for the more perfect unity
of the Trinity.33 Anonymous Gauthier, too, speaks both about form-matter
composition and about the unity achieved by successively realizing poten-
tials. Again there are two analogies, one for each model.34
Anonymous Vennebusch provides the most elaborate compromise,
positing both a real union, which is a quasi composite, and a true matter-
form composite, which is unifed only with respect to the body. He holds that
the union of the vegetative and the sensitive souls forms one single essence.
Since like genus and differentia it unites an incomplete form with a com-
plementary form, it is a composite only in a qualified sense. By contrast, the
union of the intellective soul with the sensitive soul does not produce a
single essence. It is a composite in the same sense that matter and form are
a composite. It does not form a single essence, since the intellective soul
comes from outside and is not educed by an external agent from the
potential of the sensitive soul.35
Strictly speaking, then, what SOx directly calls the ‘philosophers’ posi-
tion can be verified only in Rufus’s De anima commentary, as far as we know.
It is not a position held by other authors known to us, though variations on
it are common. Since opinions attributed to “the philosophers” in SOx have
so far been verified only in the works of Averroes and in Rufus, and this is
not Averroes’ view, this citatation is good evidence for attributing the work
to Rufus.
Fifth, there are many points of doctrine on which the author of the De
anima commentary agrees with Rufus. Some are shared with other early Aris-
totle commentators, but others are held in the early thirteenth century by no
author other than Rufus as far as we know. These include Rufus’s use of for-
mal predication and his allowance for violent local motion which continues
in the absence of contact with the original mover. Occasionally, there is ver-
bal resemblance, but more often only the views are shared. Since there are so
many parallel passages, it seemed best to divide them by subject: metaphysics,
psychology, and so on. Most of the remainder of this paper will examine
twenty-five tenets stated both in Rufus’s De anima commentary and in his
other works. Next, disagreements will be considered and a conclusion stated.
The paper will close with some reflections on dating. The outline is as follows:
33. Buckfield, In DAn, ed. D. Callus, “Two early Oxford Masters on the Prob-
lem of Plurality of Forms: Adam of Buckfield—Richard Rufus of Cornwall,” Revue
Néoscolastique de Philosophie 42 (1939): 437–38.
34. Anon., In DAn 2.6, ed. R. Gauthier, p. 214–20.
35. Anon., Questiones in tres libros De anima (Admont, Stiftsbibliotek, cod. Lat. 367),




1. Reason and sign
2. Mathematical abstraction
3. Abstraction from the conditions of hereness and nowness
4. Essential and accidental potential
5. First and second act
6. Formal predication
1.2 Metaphysics
7. The soul as a subject of metaphysics
8. The nature of light




12. Active potential and substantial change
13. Dividing the continuum
14. Resilience and projectile motion
1.4 Psychology
15. Sensation distinguished from intellection
16. Magnitude as an object of the passive intellect
17. Sensory operation
18. Vision and extramission
19. All sensibles reduced to light
20. Vision as the paradigmatic sense
21. Agent intellect acts like an external light
22. Nonnatural sensibles and intelligibles
23. The agent intellect has all intelligibles
24. The agent intellect is part of the human soul
25. Humans do not have the understanding of the agent
intellect
2. Disagreements on doctrine




1. REASON AND SIGN
Instead of distinguishing between what can be established by reason or
argument (ratio) and what is evident from experience, Rufus prefers to
distinguish between arguments from reason and arguments based on signs.
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This use of the term ‘sign’ can be understood by reference to Michael Scot
who defines ‘sign’ used in this sense as a sensible means of proof.36 Exam-
ples of this usage are frequent in In DAn and are also found in Rufus’s other
works.37 In Physics 2, for example, Rufus asks why Aristotle chooses to prove
that matter is nature not with an argument but a ‘sign’:
In Phys. 2.2.2: Quaeritur quare solum verificat materiam esse naturam
per signum et non per rationem [2.1.193a12]. (Q312.3rb)
Similarly, when adducing counter-examples against Aristotle on projec-
tile motion, Rufus describes not experience but “signs,” one of which is the
case of two projectiles which can travel in opposite directions in the same
medium without impeding each other:
In Phys. 8.3.1: Sed adhuc per plura signa videtur quod non sufficiat
ponere totam causam in medio. Si enim motus medii sic faceret motum
proiecti, tunc duo proiecta obviantia sibi impedirent sibi. (Q312.13va)
Other authors from the same period, particularly those influenced by
Rufus, use the term ‘signum’ in the same way.38
2. MATHEMATICAL ABSTRACTION
Rufus believes that all knowledge requires abstraction, but he distinguishes
the abstraction common to naturalists and logicians, indeed to all knowers
—namely, the abstraction of universals—from mathematical abstraction,
which prescinds from every material or transitory disposition. He makes
this distinction in much the same words both in In DAn and in In Phys.
In DAn 3.2.3: [D]icendum quod In Phys. 2.3.3: Sciendum quod
abstractio duplex est, duplex est abstractio,
scilicet aut abstractio ab scilicet ut solum ab eo quod est
hoc signato, et haec est abstractio hoc-aliquid, et hoc modo abstrahit
universalium, logicus universalia
et sic abstrahit et
omnis sciens. naturalis.
Est autem alio modo abstractio Et est alia abstractio
non tantum ab hoc signato non solum ab eo quod est hoc-aliquid
sed etiam ab omnibus condicionibus sed etiam a communibus dispositionibus
36. Cf. Michael Scotus (?), In De sphaero 5: “Signum est: id est, sensibile medium
est per quod probari potest” (ed. L. Thorndyke, p. 286).
37. In DAn 3.3: “Consequenter subiungit rationem . . . Hic subiungit secun-
dum rationem ad idem . . . Consequenter manifestat dictam diffinitionem per viam
signi . . . Consequenter subiungit signum, et dividitur hec pars in duas secundum
duo signa que ponit . . . Consequenter subiungit signum ad secundam partem . . .
cum sensus senserit aliquid valde excellens sive intensum . . . ” (MA.308–9); 3.3 “per
signum” (MA.324).
38. Anon., In DAn 2.14, ed. R, Gauthier, p. 323.
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materiae cuiusmodi sunt mobilitas, materiae et mobilitatis.
contrarietas et huiusmodi, et haec Et hoc modo
abstractio mathematicis debetur abstrahit mathematicus;
et non naturalibus secundum quod alio vero modo naturalis. (Q312.3va)
naturalia sunt. (MA.320, Q312.27rb)
Another author making the same point states it much more simply and in
different terms:39
3. ABSTRACTION FROM THE CONDITIONS OF HERENESS AND NOWNESS
Moreover, Rufus describes common abstraction as the removal of the con-
ditions of hereness and nowness, a description not found in other authors
of the same period.
In DAn 3.2.3: in similitudine
formae singularis est similitudo
formae universalis sive intentio In Phys. P2: Cum ergo intentiones
cum condicionibus appropriantibus principiorum sint in materia extra, magis
et facientibus illud, abstrahuntur a materia in sensus, et
ut hic et nunc. Intellectus autem adhuc magis in imaginatione, et magis
agens abstrahit hanc speciem sive adhuc per intellectum agentem per cuius
similitudinem ab his condicionibus abstractionem removentur illae
appropriantibus per eius prae- condiciones ‘hic et nunc’ quae fuerunt
sentiam super imaginabile. prohibentes ne fieret intelligens.
(MA.331, Q312.28ra) (Q312.3va)
4. ESSENTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL POTENTIAL
Taken from Averoes,40 the distinction between essential and accidental
potential is commonly used, but its wording in In DAn is strikingly similar
to a passage from In Phys.:
Rufus, In DAn 2.5: . . . Rufus, In Phys. P2: Et est potentia
potentia accidentalis illa quae non indiget nisi
quaedam est essentialis tantum removente prohibens ad hoc quod
sive remota. . . . exeat in actum, ut lapis retentus sursum
existens in potentia est in potentia deorsum.
primo modo dicta est in potentia Potentia vero essentialis est quae
prima indigens agente transmutante indiget agente et transmutante
et disponente ipsum ad hoc ut exeat et disponente ad hoc quod exeat
in actum; existens autem in in actum.
potentia secundo modo dicta . . .
se ipso potest exire in actum, . . . et
solum indiget solvente prohibens. (MA. 166)
39. See Anonymi magistri artium (c. 1246–1247) Sententia super I I et III De
anima (Oxford, Bodleian Libr., Lat. Misc. c. 70, f. 1ra–25b, Roma, Bibl. naz. V.E.
828, f. 46vb, 48ra–52ra), ed. B. Carlos Bazán. Henceforth Anon., In De anima, ed.
C. Bazán.
40. Averroes, In Phys. 8.32, Iunt. 4: 168; Aristot., Phys. 8.4.225a30–255b31.
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Few medieval authors employ this distinction as frequently and as
prominently as Rufus, who sometimes states it quite crisply: essential poten-
tial can only be actualized by an [external] agent, while the realization of
an accidental potential requires only the removal of an obstacle.41 As a
theologian, Rufus continues somewhat apologetically to use the same dis-
tinction, referring to it as a teaching of worldly letters.42
5. FIRST AND SECOND ACT
Closely related to the distinction between essential and accidental potential
is Rufus’s use of the distinction between first and second act. This distinc-
tion is used to explain an unusual sense of the term ‘act’, the sense in which
the soul is in act and unrealized knowledge is actual. Sleepers have the first
act, also called the habit, of science without actually being able to reflect on
or consider things.
Reference to the first act of the soul stems ultimately from Aristotle
[DAn 2.1.412a27–28] and in the thirteenth century from Alfred of
Sareshel, who tells us that the first act of the soul is life, which is prior to
all motion; indeed, it starts the movement of the heart. For Alfred, the
closer a motion is to this first act the more perfect it is.43 Alfred’s distinc-
tion comes from a passage in Aristotle, where he asserts that life itself is
the power of perception or thinking (ENic 9.9.1170a15–19), which is as-
41. Cf. Rufus, In Phys. 2.1.5: “Dicendum ad primum quod mobile quoddam est
in potentia essentiali, quoddam in potentia accidentali. Illud autem quod est primo
modo in potentia indiget agente extra, dante aliquo modo sive educente speciem. .
. . Sed actu grave cum descendit est in potentia accidentali, et praeter hoc in se ipso
habet principium sui motus” (Q312.3rb).
Cf. Rufus, In APos 1: “Sed intelligendum quod potentia duplex est, essentialis
et accidentalis. Intelligendum ergo quod illud quod primo modo est in potentia
proprie dicitur fieri cum exit in actum. Quod autem secundo modo est in potentia,
non proprie dicitur fieri tale, sed essentiale [iam esse]. Est enim tale ubi sit
prohibitum, et est dicere quod essentialiter tale est, licet accidentaliter sit non tale,
sicut lapis est deorsum essentialiter, licet accidentaliter sit sursum” (Q312.29vb).
Cf. etiam Rufus, In De Generatione et corruptione (In DGen) 1.2.5: “Sed duplex est
potentia—essentialis, scilicet, et accidentalis. Generabile autem est in utraque po-
tentia. Ad hoc enim quod ignis generetur in materia aeris, oportet adesse agens et
educens ignem de materia. Oportet etiam destruere formam aeris et sic solvere
prohibens” (Q312.14va).
Rufus, Memoriale in Metaph (MMet) 7.16: “Sed ut quaesita in parte ista pateant
intellige quod miscibilia sunt in mixto non potentia essentiali nec in actu, sed in
potentia accidentali sive secundum actum incompletum, non tamen violente prop-
ter confusionem formarum suarum in naturam tertiam quae est forma mixti. Unde
si solvatur forma mixti, quodlibet tendit ad suum ubi” Quarto 290 (Q290), 49va.
42. Rufus, SOx 1.2: “Est adhuc modus alius, sicut docent litterae mundane:
leve, cum est in potentia essentiali, indiget motore essentiali” (B62.30vb).
43. Alfred Sareshel, De motu cordis 8.1, ed. C. Baeumker, Beitrage zur Aschen-
dorff, Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelaters (BGPM) 23, (Muenster in W.:
Aschendorff, 1923). Cf. Aristotle, DAn 4.1.412a27–28.
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similated to the claim that life itself is an act.44 Neither Aristotle nor Alfred
refer to a second act.
By the time of Philip the Chancellor, both a first and a second act are
mentioned, but the distinction is not between having and exercising a
power. Rather, the first act is the perfection of the thing itself and the
second is an act initiated by the thing but extending beyond it.45
Averroes presents precisely the same distinction as Rufus. However, he
describes not first and second acts, but primary (first) and posterior perfec-
tions.46 Avicenna describes a variety of related distinctions, but again does
not refer to first and second acts.
Rufus explicates Aristotle’s distinction between scientia and consideratio
(2.1.412a21–28) by reference to a passage from the Physics 8.4.255a30–
255b31, where Aristotle distinguishes proximate and remote potential and
offers the same example. In his De anima commentary, Rufus explicitly
makes the link between proximate and remote potential and first and
second act to explain the sense in which the soul is an act.47 Elsewhere in
his writings, he repeatedly describes the distinction between scientia and
consideratio in terms of first and second acts.48
44. Summa Halesiana, Quaracchi 1924–1948 (ut Summa Fratris Alexandri) 4.478,
2.1: 653.
45. Philippus C., Summa de bono, “De bono” 7, ed. N. Wicki, (Berne: Editiones
Franken, 1985), p. 27.
46. Averroes, In DAn 2.6, ed. F. Crawford, CCA 6.1: 137. Philoponus posits a
similar distinction between first and second act. See In Arist. De gen. et corr. Commen-
taria, ed. H. Vitelli: (Berlin 1897) p. 188. But that work was not available in Latin
until after 1527 (Vitelli, p. x).
47. Rufus, In DAn 2.1: “ . . . credatur hoc de potentia remota . . . non de
potentia propinqua . . . dicens quod anima est actus ipsius corporis aut sicut primus
actus scilicet, et hoc ad minus, aut sicut actus secundus, ut actu videre est ipsius
organi visui (MA. 122).
Rufus, In DAn 3.3.4: “Dicendum ,praem. Et MA. quod anima est actus non ut
considerare sed ut scientia, id ,id est scilicet MA. est, eo quod habitualiter
exerceret ,exercet MA. suas operationes, non semper actualiter” (MA. 329,
Q312.27vb).
48. Cf. Rufus, In Phys.: 3.1.8: “Actus est duplex: primus et secundus—primus,
ut substantia est actus formae, secundum quod dicimus quod scientia in habitu est
actus scientis; secundus autem est ipsa forma cum operatione sua cuiusmodi est
considerare” (Q312.5rb).
Cf. etiam Rufus, CAv 1: “Sed tertio modo dicta forma, scilicet habitus et actus
primus non secundus, qui est ut considerare.” (Q312.83rb).
Rufus, Speculum animae (SAn): “Scis autem quod vita animae est primus actus
—actus animae—primus, dico, actus non secundus, prout dividit ille Philosophus
actus primus et secundus, scientia et considerare, habitus scilicet et actus—opus,
scilicet, usuale. Sic, Vir Dei, dormiendo vivis. Et est secundum Philosophum (ENic
9.9.1170a15–16) ‘vita in apprehendentibus omnibus apprehensio’—dico ‘appre-
hensio’ actus primus non necessario secundus” (Q312.109vb).
Rufus, SOx pr: “Dupliciter dicitur cognitio, scilicet habitus et actus, actus
primus et secundus” (B62.12rb).
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The various distinctions we have been discussing are not identical in
meaning. Alfred’s first act is prior temporally and in nobility. For Philip, the
distinction between first and second act is between the perfection of a thing
and its external act. Bonaventure accepts Philip’s version of the distinc-
tion.49 The Summa Halesiana posits three kinds of act, something Rufus
never does.50
Other authors use the same terminology to make the same distinction,
but (as far as we know) never before 1238. For example, Albert uses it to
explain how someone sleeping can be described as actually knowing with-
out exercising that knowledge.51 These authors, however, knew and used
Rufus’s works.52 Rufus’s usage of the distinction was not common when he
first employed it.
6. FORMAL PREDICATION
Unknown in other early thirteenth-century authors, except when they are
citing Rufus,53 is the distinction between what is subjectively or substantially
the same and what is the same by formal predication. The search for the
early scholastic predecessor to whom Scotus refers under the rubric “antiqui
doctores when stating the formal distinction had gone on unsuccessfully for
many decades when Franz Pelster and Gedeon Gál identified Rufus as the
ancient doctor in question.54 Rufus’s development of this distinction is a key
to the comparative dating of his works, so instances of its use will be quoted
below in section 2.
49. Bonaventura, Sent. 3.27, Opera Omnia (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaven-
turae ad Claras Aquas, 1882–1902), OO 3:617.
50. Summa Halesiana 4.478, 2.1: 653–55.
51. Cf. Albert, In DAn 2.3.2, ed. C. Stroik, (Muenster in W: Aschendorff, 1968),
Opera Omnia Coloniensis, OO 7.1:99. Cf. etiam Anon., In DAn 2.2.2e, ed. R.
Gauthier, p. 162.
52. Gauthier documents references to Rufus in the edition just cited, as notes
to Pseudo Peter of Spain. In a recent talk at Bonn, E. Karger recently showed that
Albert quoted Rufus. Cf. “Albert the Great as a Reader of Rufus,” Bonn, Aug. 15,
2000, “Die Anfäge der Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter.”
53. Anon., In DAn 2.13 q.2: “Et uidetur quod non, quoniam, sicut dicit in
littera, color est per se uisiblis, non ita quod sit ibi praedicatio formalis, set causalis,
quoniam habet in se causam quare uideatur; non requiritur ergo lumen extra per
defectum coloris” (ed. R. Gauthier, p. 310). Gauthier refers to MA. 179.
54. Scotus, Ordinatio 1.8 pars 1.4.194: “Et istud argument ‘de non formali
identitate’ dixerunt antiqui doctores ponentes in divinis aliquam esse praedica-
tionem veram per identitatem quae tamen non esset formalis: ita concedo ego, per
identitatem bonitatem esse veritatem in re, non tamen veritatem esse formaliter
bonitatem” (Opera Omnia 4.262).
F. Pelster, “Die älteste Abkürzung und Kritik von Sentenzkommentar des hl.
Bonaventura,” Gregorianum 17 (1936): 217–20. Cf. etiam G. Gál, “Viae ad exis-
tentiam Dei probandam,” Franziskanische Studien 38 (1956) 182: “En celebris
distinctio formalis, non solum adumbrata, sed iam nomine appellata” See also




7. THE SOUL AS A SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS
In what sense does the metaphysician consider the soul, and how does the
metaphysics of the soul differ from its psychology? Both when lecturing on
the Metaphysics and when lecturing on De anima, Rufus answers with a
distinction based loosely on Avicenna: the study of the soul per se must be
distinguished from the study of the soul as the principal of animation.55
Rufus tells us that metaphysics treats the soul as a spirit or intelligentia—that
is, as a substance abstracted from or unconnected with a body. By contrast,
the psychologist considers the soul as the “act of a natural body,” a variation
on Aristotle’s definition of the soul [2.1.412a19–22, 27–28, 2.1.412b5–6,
2.4.415b7].56 At least one author subsequent to Rufus, the author of the
Philosophica disciplina which seem to have been influenced by Rufus’s intro-
duction to his Physics commentary makes the same distinction. At about
1245, he concludes that the metaphysician studies the soul in itself, abso-
lutely, as a separate, spiritual substance or intelligence.57
8. THE NATURE OF LIGHT
Common to every composite being—that is, everything apart from God—
elemental or celestial, is the nature of light, incorporeal light. That claim is
made both in the De anima lectures and the early Memoriale in Metaph.
(MMet).
In DAn 2.15.4: Omne corpus compositum habet in se naturam caelestem, ut
lucem incorporatam qua mediante conservatur et per quam est forma
eius particularis in sua materia ipsam perficiens. (Q312.26va)
MMet 10.4: . . . sphaerae non continuantur neque supracaelestes neque
elementares. Dicitur tamen unum ex his aut propter unum finem, sicut
dictum est, aut propter unam naturam communicatam in his ut natura
lucis. (Q290.51vb)
55. Avicenna, Liber de anima 5.1, ed. S. van Riet, 2:80.
56. Rufus, In DAn 2: “Haec enim differentia incorporeum est ipsius animae
secundum quod anima est in se absoluta substantia, scilicet secundum quod anima
est de consideratione metaphysici. Sic autem non intendit hic de anima sed secun-
dum quod est natura sive actus corporis naturalis” (Q312.22va).
Rufus, DMet 1: “Anima duplicem habet considerationem. Consideratur enim
ipsa in quantum anima, et hoc est inquantum actus corporis naturalis et sic etiam
unita cum corpore. Consideratur autem alio modo in quantum spiritus vel intelli-
gentia et secundum istum modum non consideratur ipsa in quantum est in corpore.
De ipsa autem considerata secundum primum modum est scientia de anima. De
ipsa autem considerata secundum modum ultimum fit perscrutatio in ista scientia”
(Vat. lat. 4538.2rb).
57. Anon., Philosophica disciplina, ed. C. LaFleur, in Quatre introductions à la
philosophie au XIIIe siècle, (Montréal: Institut d’Études Médiévales, Université de
Montréal, 1988), p. 264.
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Rufus’s Physics and De anima commentaries identify this light with
Aristotelian quintessence. But the claim itself is carefully qualified. The
being and capacity to act of every composite is preserved by a nature in
which they participate, but that nature is not a part of them, nor does it
pertain to their essence.
Phys. 4.1.8: Propterea dicendum quod haec natura est forma, sed non
est forma quae sit pars rei sicut dictum est prius. . . . est enim in omnibus
his inferioribus elementis sive elementatis, praeter materiam et for-
mam quae est pars rei . . . [forma] quae non est pars rei, quae est natura
corporis quinti, per quam custoditur et salvatur forma quae est pars rei in
materia. (Q312. 7va)
Particular forms act in virtue of the superior form or quintessence in
which they participate, but that quintessence is not part of their essence.
In DAn 1.6: Dicendum quod cum elementa habeant formas particu-
lares . . . terminatae sunt et ligatae materiae, non possunt de se facere se
extra se, et ita nec aliquid agere, sed per participationem formae supe-
rioris ut naturae corporis quinti possunt agere. Haec autem forma com-
munis eis non est de eorum essentia ut ipsam ingrediens. (Q312.20ra)
Beings cannot be reduced to a single nature, but they act in virtue of a
shared nature.
In DAn 2.15.4: Dicendum quod sensibilia non sunt aliquid unum sive
unius naturae; quantitas enim et qualitas, ut magnitudo et color, non
reducuntur ad aliquid unum quod sit de eis . . . Sic igitur intelligendum
quod omnia sensiblia communicant in natura lucis, scilicet non tanquam
in aliquo quod sit de eorum essentia, sed tanquam in aliquo per quod
omnia sensibilia immutant ipsos sensus. (Q312.26va)
9. THE FIRST CAUSE AS THE UNIVERSAL FORM
Qualified in the same way is the closely related claim that God, or the first
cause, is the form of everything. Rufus describes God as the ‘forma omnium’
or ‘causa formalis omnium.’ God is the divine exemplar, idea, or species of all
things, as we learn from Rufus’s De intellectu divino, his Physics commentary,
and his De anima lectures.58 Already somewhat old-fashioned in the 1230s,
this claim is as characteristic of Grosseteste as of Rufus,59 who modifies it in
58. Rufus, In Phys. 1.1.3: “Intelligendum quod prima causa est forma omnium
sive exemplar sicut sigillum est forma cerae” (Q312.1vb).
Rufus, De intellectu divino: “Ideo dicendum quod hoc est quia ipse est forma et
species et similitudo, unde est causa efficiens ,effectus A. et finis et forma
omnium” (Assisi 138.262vb).
59. Cf. Grosseteste, Epistolae, ed. H. R. Luard (London: Longman, Green,
Longman, and Roberts, 1861), pp. 1–7.
134 REGA WOOD
the De anima,60 as he explains that Aristotle’s understanding of participation
in the divine differs from the Neoplatonic participation in the divine ideas,
expressed by the phrase “forma omnium.” Aristotle explicitly denies that
things communicate with the divine; they can only imitate divine immortal-
ity by reproducing and hence preserving the species. Rufus correctly in-
formed his students that for Aristotle the only aspect of the divine imitated
by creatures is incorruptibility. Despite what Aristotle says, however, it is true
that God or the first being is the formal cause of all things, as their
exemplar. To deny this would be unchristian, as Rufus’s teacher, Alexander
of Hales, claims on Augustine’s authority.61 Rufus both supports and quali-
fies exemplarism in In DAn: God is the form of all things in the sense of
being the exemplar in accordance with which they are shaped and pre-
served. God is not the form of everything in the sense of being a part of
them. Normally unqualified, such views were common in the generation of
Grosseteste and Hales; much less so in Rufus’s time.
1.3 Natural Philosophy
10. WORLD SOUL
10. Surprisingly, and very uncommonly for an Aristotle commentator, Rufus
posits a world soul, which moves the spheres and without which there would
be no time.
In Phys. 4.3.17: non exsistente anima mundi, non erit tempus.
(Q312.19va)
In DAn 1.3: . . . Anima autem mundi est principium motus . . . Et ille
iterum circulus, scilicet anima secundum quod est principium motus
zodiaci, dividitur in septem circulos. (Q312.19v)
Grosseteste, too, sometimes spoke of the world soul as the cause of the
revolution of the heavens.62 But in later life he was more circumspect.
Commenting on the same passage as Rufus, he refers to those who suppose
60. Rufus, DAn 2: “Et intelligendum per hoc quod dicit omnia participare esse
divinum, non oportet ponere ipsum primum communicari ab omnibus tanquam
formam eorum, sed intelligit per esse divinum esse incorruptibile tantum.
Verumtamen verum est quod ipsum Primum est causa formalis omnium, non quae
sit pars rei simpliciter separata a forma rei . . . Similiter ipsum Primum sive exem-
plaria, in primo sunt formae quasi exemplum iuxta quod conservatur res in esse,
cum tamen non sit de essentia rei” (MA.149, Q312.22vb).
61. Alexander de Hales, Glossa in Sent. 1.36.4, ed. Quaracchi 1951, Bibliotheca
Francescana Scholastica (BFS), 12:357.
62. Grosseteste, De sphaera, ed. L. Bauer: “ . . . circumvolvitur coelum . . . cuius
motus causa efficiens est anima mundi” (BGPM 9:13).
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that time comes from the celestial soul.63 According to J. McEvoy, Grosse-
teste eventually retracted the opinion.64 The rareness of the view among
Aristotle commentators, makes this important evidence for Rufus’s author-
ship of the De anima commentary, but it was not an opinion which played
an important role in Rufus’s thought.
11. DIMENSION
More significant for understanding Rufus’s views is an extended concept of
dimension. In addition to mathematical dimensions, there are natural
dimensions.65 In the Physics commentary ‘dimensio’ refers to extensions of
action, change, motion, (7.1.6, Q312.18vb), and time.
In Phys. 2.4.3: Si ad fieri rei comparetur causa, dupliciter: cum sit fieri
dimensio et fluxus ab uno in aliud. (Q312.3vb)
In Phys. 2.6.1: Actio est sicut via et dimensio quaedam a quo et in quid.
Cum autem est actio in fieri, terminatur quantum ad partem eius a quo;
non terminatur autem sed est in fieri ex parte eius ad quod. (Q312.4rb)
In Phys. 4.3.19: . . . tempus et motus et omnia successiva dimensionantur
solum secundum longitudinem sive secundum prius et posterius.
(Q312.9ra)
Even the connection between a subject and a predicate can be referred
to as a dimension, as Rufus’s Posterior analytics commentary shows.
In APos 1: Est enim propositio quaedam dimensio inter subiectum et
praedicatum, ut alias patet, (Q312.30va)
In In DAn, we find science described as the dimension or connection
between an axiom and a conclusion.
63. Grosseteste, In Phys. 4, loquitur de aliquibus qui “putaverunt . . . esse
tempus in anima celi” (ed. R. Dales, p. 95).
64. J. McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1982), pp. 373–78. Cf. etiam Grosseteste, Hex. 3.7–8, ed. R. Dales and S. Gieben
(London: British Academy, 1982) pp. 106–9, 218.
65. Rufus, In DGen 2.5.7, Q312.18va. Rufus played a role in formulating the
Western distinction between complete forms and incomplete forms or rather mo-
tion toward these forms as a distinction between forma and forma.ad viam. It is a
distinction that comes from Avicenna (Sufficientia 2.1, Venice 1508, fol. 23rb) and
Averroes (In Phys. 3.4, Luntina 1550, fol. 41rb). But as C. Trifogli shows, Rufus’s
immediate successors followed his statement of the distinction. Judging from Trifo-
gli’s quotations, however, the Oxford tradition influenced by Rufus did not follow
him in explicating the term ‘via’ as a dimension or flux (dimensio, fluxus). See C.
Trifogli, Oxford Physics in the Thirteenth Century, (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 73–75.
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In DAn. 1.1.10: Scientiam autem posuit binarium, quia ibi est processus
ab unitate ut a principio ad unum ut ad conclusionem tantum unam;
et est quasi dimensio una terminata ad duo ultima. (Q312.20va)
12. ACTIVE POTENTIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE
Also important and characteristic is Rufus’s description of substantial
change, according to which incomplete forms have the potential to yield to
more complete forms, so that taken together they comprise a unifed sub-
stance, which is actually one.
In DAn 1.5: Et dicemus quod cum fuerint tres animae secundum essen-
tiam differentes, uniuntur ad invicem et cedunt in unam substantiam
animae per hoc quod anima vegetativa et sensitiva sunt ut ens in potentia
respectu animae intellectivae quae est ut actus respectu illorum, quia
cedunt in unam substantiam animae quae est hominis perfectio.
(Q312.20rb)
Rufus also describes an incomplete form as an active potential.
In Phys. 7.2.4: Dico potentiam activam quando hoc est in potentia re-
spectu illius quod hoc fiat hoc vel cedat in hoc. (Q312.11va)
Normally, change does not occur without an external agent, which elicits
the forces that drive the internal change and constitute its ultimate differ-
entiae.
MMet 7.9: “Et istae virtutes aeris cum in principio sint motor, in fine
transmutationis cedunt in naturam differentiae. Unde ex istis et ex ista
natura ente sub genere sive ex intentione generis fit vere unum in actu,
scilicet forma aeris generati, et sic unum elementum ex materia alterius
generatur. (Q290.28va)
That is, an active potential can only be realized when the agent and what is
acted on differ. Recognizing the difficulty, in In DAn Rufus describes an
exception in which the active potential does not require this, and an agent
can act on its own matter.
In DAn. 2.5.1: Dubitatur super hoc quod dicit quod si lignum vel
sensitivum esset in potentia activa, non indigeret extrinseco ad hoc quod
ageret. . . . Dicendum ,Ad hoc praem. MA. quod ad hoc quod agens
per actionem adgeneret ,ageret (?) MA. speciem in quo prius non
fuit, indiget materia extra in quam agat. Ad hoc autem quod agens per
suam actionem salvet speciem suam in materia in qua est, non indiget
,eget MA. aliquo extrinseco tali. Sicut cum ,om. E. ignis generatur
in ligno, ad hoc ut salvet speciem suam in materia propria ,om. MA.,
agit in materiam propriam et non necessario in aliam, quamdiu potest
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illa materia in illo loco ,pos. manere MA. manere. Si autem sensiti-
vum esset in potentia activa, esset hoc secundo modo; solum enim
ageret ut salvaret speciem suam et non ut ipsam in alio generaret. Et
propterea non indigeret extrinseco sed per se ipsum exiret in actum.
(MA.I64, Q312.23rb)
13. DIVIDING THE CONTINUUM
Another key to Rufus’s natural philosophy is his description of dividing the
continuum. Surprisingly, this account is closely related to his discussion of
substantial change, since Rufus describes the generation of a specific sub-
stantial form from a generic form by analogy with the division of a contin-
uum in his Physics commentary.
In Phys. 7.2.4: Hoc non est mirum, supposita hac propositione, quod
essentia incompleta—quod est genus—cedit in diversas essentias, sicut
punctus cedit in diversa puncta. Et quod genus cedat in diversas essentias,
hoc oportet dicere si dicamus quod fiat species per receptionem non
alterius essentiae. (Q312.11va)
In the De anima commentary, Rufus appeals to his account of the division
of the continuum at a point to explain the sense in which an indivisible soul
can be divided and extended.
In DAn 1.5.2: Dicendum quod anima sensibilis vel vegetabilis per acci-
dens dividitur. Hoc vocabulum ‘dividi’ dupliciter potest sumi—scilicet,
aut proprie ut dicatur dividi aliquid cum ex illo fiant duo vel plura, ut
linea dividitur in duas medietates—aut potest sumi communiter—scili-
cet, ut dicatur id dividi quod fit duo vel plura et non ex quo fiunt duo. Et hoc
modo secundo est anima per accidens divisibilis. Et intelligatur opti-
mum simile in puncto quod proprie est simpliciter indivisibile.
(Q312.20rb–va)
Rufus uses this analogy to support his claim that these souls can be in
different parts of the body without being divided. Dividing a line at A does
not divide A. Rather when a line is divided one point becomes two. Strictly
speaking it is mistaken to say that two points are made from A; instead one
point (A itself) becomes two.
In DAn 1.5.2: proponatur linea cuius medius punctus sit A. Dividatur
linea super punctum A. Igitur ante divisionem fuit unum punctum
numero. Post divisionem autem est duo puncta numero. Est enim A
terminus unius medietatis lineae et etiam terminus alterius medietatis.
Et est in utraquae medietate totum A. Nec fiunt duo puncta ex ipso A, quia
ipsum fuit simpliciter indivisibile. Et quia ante divisionem fuit A termi-
nus utriusque medietatis non secundum quod separata sunt sed secun-
dum quod uniuntur in totalem lineam, fuit A unus punctus numero
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ante divisionem. Facta autem divisione, quia A est terminus utriusque
medietatis non secundum quod unita sunt sed distincta ab invicem, est
A duo puncta numero. (Q312.20rb–va)
Phys. 6.1.5: Videtur quod punctus sit divisibile, et nunc. Sumatur aliqua
linea, et sumatur in ea A punctus qui est continuans duas partes lineae.
Dividatur linea super A punctum. Sequitur, ut videtur, quod A dividatur
in duo puncta, quia utraque medietas eundem terminum modo habet
post divisionem quem prius habuit ante divisionem, et sunt actualiter
duo termini post divisionem. Ex A ergo, qui fuit unus, fiunt duo.
Dicendum quod per se loquendo non est proprie dicendum ex A fieri duo,
sed ipsum A fieri duo. Totum enim A et remanet terminus unius et terminus
alterius, et propterea non est dicere A dividi. (Q312.9vb)
14. RESILIENCE AND PROJECTILE MOTION
Probably of less general relevance is Rufus’s account of a special case of
local motion. Rufus reworks Aristotle’s analogy between local motion and
alteration in the De anima commentary in order to accommodate the
explanation of projectile motion he provides in the Physics commentary.
According to Rufus, in local motion, or motus depulsionis, motion sometimes
continues after the initial mover, which initially impelled the medium to
move, has stopped moving.66 By contrast, in alteration, motion stops at once
if the mover stops moving. Rufus ascribes the continued motion of the
medium to resilience. Resilience is not motion per se but per accidens; it
occurs when a substance is violently rarefied or condensed beyond the
degree dictated by its form. So pressured condensed air, for example,
springs back out. But since the initial impulse was violent, the counter-move-
ment goes too far, leaving parts which were pushed too close together now
too distant from each other. Again there is a rebound; this time the air
springs back, moving inward.67 The result of repeated rebounds is a tremor
or vibration. Importantly, such tremors do not interfere with each other.68
That means that a single resilient medium can assist and accomodate the
movement of projectiles moving in opposite directions.
Thus the same account of the movement of the medium in projectile
motion is provided both in Rufus’s De anima and in his Physics commen-
tary.69 It is an account of unusual cases of local motion which continue in
the absence of contact with an external mover—motion without substantial
contact. Bacon explicitly rejects the claim that virtual contact can substitute
for substantial contact. And contrary to Rufus, Bacon allows the continu-
ance of a force (virtus) without substantial contact in alteration but not local
66. Rufus, In DAn 3.11, MA. 393. Rufus, In Phys. 8.3.1, Q312.13va–vb.
67. Rufus, In DAn 2.8, MA. 197–98. Rufus, In Phys. 8.3.1, Q312.13va–vb.
68. Rufus, In DAn 2.8, MA. 197–98.
69. Rufus, In DAn 2.8 and 3.11, MA.197–98, 393. Rufus, In Phys. 8.3.1,
Q312.13va–vb.
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motion.70 So characteristic is this account that Anneliese Maier was not able
to discover any other author who espoused the account of projectile motion
opposed by Bacon before 1300.71
1.4 Psychology
Alteration also plays an important role in Rufus’s psychology. Rufus believes
that sensation is alteration without corruption. This distinguishes it, on the
one hand, from intellection and on the other hand from other kinds of
qualitative change. Something can be subject to the action of another in
three ways. Strictly speaking, being subject or suffering (pati) involves cor-
ruption, as is the case when something cold becomes hot; to undergo in this
sense is to receive and thereby to be corrupted.72 Less properly, a subject
can undergo change without corruption, so that by receiving it is changed
and completed. In the commonest, least general sense of the term, a subject
can receive and be completed without being changed.
15. SENSATION DISTINGUISHED FROM INTELLECTION
It is the second sense of being subject which defines sensation: it is altera-
tion or reception with change but without corruption. An organ is completed
rather than corrupted when sensation occurs.
In Phys 7.1.16: et praeterea adveniente specie alicuius sensibilis alterat
ipsum organum, quoad illam completionem . . . et alterato organo
alteratur ipsa anima quae radicatur in ipso organo. (Q312.11ra)
In DAn 3.2: Dicendum ,praem. Et MA. ad primum quod omnis sensus
immutatur . . . Non est ergo solum in potentia receptiva sed est ibi aliqua natura
quae aliquo modo communicat cum suis sensibilibus per quorum sensi-
bilium unionem cum ipsa natura recipit, et immutatur sensus. Sed illa
70. Bacon, Quaestiones super libros octo Phys., ed. F. Delorme and R. Steele, OHI
13:339.
71. Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie: Das Problem der
intensiven Grösse, die Impetustheorie. (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e letteratura, 1968), pp.
141, 147–48; see also Die Impetustheorie der Scholastik, (Wien: Schroll, 1940), 17–22,
32–33.
72. Rufus, In DAn 2.14: “Dicendum ,Et praem. MA. quod . . . est quoddam
pati quod consistit in corrumpendo formam praehabitam . . . ut patet in calido et
frigido. Quoddam ,Quod MA. autem non in ,om. MA. corrumpendo sed ,om.
MA. salvando formam praehabitam et in recipiendo maiorem completionem per
agens, et huiusmodi passione patitur sensitivum a sensibili secundum actum. Sensi-
bile enim factum in esse immateriali immutat organum uniens se cum proportione
sive medietate quae est forma ipsius organi magis complens ipsum, et propterea
cedunt in unum sensibile secundum actum et sensitivum” (MA. 269–70,
Q312.26rb). Cf. etiam MA.316.
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natura non similiter sed ,sed aliter pos. habet MA. aliter se habet ante
huiusmodi receptionem sive unionem et post. Ergo ista receptio cum
alteratione quadam est. Ergo cum ipsa virtus sensitiva mediante huius-
modi proportione educatur per alterationem huius naturae sive propor-
tionis, per consequens alterationem quandam recipiet. Est ergo in sensu
pati per receptionem cum alteratione quadam. (MA. 311, Q312.27ra)
In intellection, by contrast, not only is there no corruption, but no change.
The possible intellect is completed but not altered by receiving intelligible
species.
In Phys 7.1.16: Sed intellectus non sic est; intellectus enim noster possibilis
non intelligit omnia per hoc quod unam habet proportionem quae est
medietas omnium intelligibilium, sed solum quia est quasi ens in poten-
tia receptiva, potens ea recipere et impleri per ipsam, et sicut compleri non
est alterari, sic nec intelligere est alterari. Dicendum ergo quod intelligit
similitudinem inter sentire et intelligere non penes hoc quod sentire
est alterari aliquo modo, sed penes hoc quod praeter alterari est complere.
(Q312.11ra)
In DAn 3.2: Sed intellectus recipit non mediante forma aliqua, sive huius-
modi mediante, intelligibilium cui uniuntur intelligibilia, sed inest ei pati
per solam receptionem. Est enim sicut tabula nuda nihil habens depictionis
et propterea non est similiter passibilis sicut sensus. (MA. 311,
Q312.27ra)
What is controversial in this account of the difference between the senses
and the passive intellect is the claim that the senses are altered in sensation.
According to commentators in the next decade, neither the sense nor the
intellect is altered by receiving species.73 But Rufus consistently adheres to
his early position, repeating it in subsequent works.74
16. MAGNITUDE AS AN OBJECT OF THE PASSIVE INTELLECT
Another important difference between sense and intellect is that nothing
material can be the object of the intellect. How then can the intellect
perceive extended magnitudes? Rufus answers that it is not matter, but
privation which impedes intelligibility. But magnitude is logically prior to
privation, since magnitude is an immediate consequence of the union of
matter and form. Therefore, magnitude can be an object of intellect.
In Phys P9: Et hoc potest patere sic: tria sunt principia corporis natu-
ralis: materia, forma [et] privatio. Sed duo illorum sunt principia substan-
73. Anon., In DAn 3.3, ed. R. Gauthier, p. 481.
74. SAn: “Ad idem: sentire quoddam pati est et quaedam alteratio”
(Q312.107va).
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tiae tantum, tertium autem transmutabilitatis. Prius autem secundum
naturam est quod per compositionem duorum ad invicem—scilicet, formae et
materiae—fiat substantia quam quod per adventum privationis fiat substantia
transmutabilis. . . . Forma autem adveniens materiae quae est in potentia
corpus facit et magnitudinem. (Q312.1rb)
The Physics account is reprised in In DAn.
In DAn 3.2.3: Dicendum ,praem. Et MA. ad primum quod duo ,om.
E. sunt principia substantiae compositae secundum quod substantia est,
scilicet materia et forma ex quibus constat. Substantiae autem secun-
dum quod naturalis sive mobilis ,materialis est MA. tria sunt principia,
scilicet materia, ,add. et MA. forma et privatio. . . . Transmutabilitas
igitur in ipsa substantia causatur a defectu dicto sive privatione. Sed
prius secundum naturam est ut forma uniatur materiae . . . Ergo ,Igitur
MA. prius secundum naturam est ut sit actu corpus quam quod suae
materiae adveniat privatio. Sed privatio ,primo MA. est causa condi-
cionum materialium ut mobilitas, contrarietas et huiusmodi. Ergo
prius secundum naturam est actu corpus quam ei adveniat huiusmodi
condiciones. Sed ad actu corpus immediate consequitur magnitudo.
(MA. 318–19, Q312.27rb)
How does magnitude become an object of intellect? It can be abstracted
without distortion, because magnitude is naturally prior to the mutability
brought about by the union of matter and form with privation.75
In Phys P9: Sic patet quod numerus et magnitudo veniunt in esse prius
secundum naturam quam adveniat privatio; et propterea prius secundum
naturam quam aliqua passio corporis naturalis sive corporis mobilis in
quantum mobile. Et propterea possunt numerus et magnitudo ab-
strahi, cum nulla passio naturalis sit de eorum essentia; nec est men-
dacium abstrahentium. (Q312.1rb)
In DAn 3.2.3: Ergo essentia magnitudinis naturaliter praecedit omnes condi-
ciones materiales a privatione causatas. Ergo magnitudo secundum sui
,suam MA. absentiam absolvitur ab omni condicione huiusmodi. Si
igitur sic intelligatur sive consideratur magnitudo, considerabitur magni-
tudo secundum essentiam eius absolutam ab omnibus huiusmodi condicionibus
et non prout est cum istis condicionibus. Et huic considerationi non inerit
mendacium. (MA. 318–19, Q312.27rb)
This view is adopted by Rufus’s successors, but they state it differently.76
75. Explanations of natural priority play a considerable role in Rufus’s
thought. It is his explanation for why we speak of a wooden cube rather than cubic
wood—still another parallel between the Physics and the De anima commentaries.
See Rufus, In Phys. 7.1.10, Q312.11ra and In DAn 2.1.4, Q312.22va.
76. Anon., In DAn 3.2, ed. Bazán, p. 404.
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17. SENSORY OPERATION
Rufus takes his account of the operation of the senses and sensory organs
from a section in Aristotle where he is accounting for the capacity of the
senses to perceive a variety of sensory objects. In a modern translation, it
reads: “sense itself being a sort of mean between the opposites that charac-
terize the objects of perception.”77 The translations available to Rufus were
quite different from one another. In the Vetus, he read:
De anima 2.11.424a4: tanquam sensu ut medietate quadam existente in
sensibilium contrarietatibus, (ed. K. White, in Anon., In DAn, ed. B. C.
Bazán, 2.22, p. 273)
In Averroes, there was the more congenial:
De anima 2.11.424a4: sensus enim est quasi medium inter contrarie-
tatem in sensibilibus (ed. F. Crawford, in Averroes, In DAn 2.118, p.
313)
Rufus added a gloss and adopted a compromise, which is repeated in his
other works78 and subsequently echoed by other authors.79
Rufus, In DAn 2.11.4: omnis sensus est medietas quaedam suorum
sensibilium, id est organum cuiuslibet. (Q312.25ra)
Once accepted, this tenet is the basis for Rufus’s view about how sensory
organs are comprised, their nature is so proportioned to their objects, as to
be finally completed by the mean proportion (media proportio) of their
sensory objects, a view Rufus repeats verbatim in his commentaries on De
anima and Physica:
Rufus, In DAn 3.2: Dicendum ad Rufus, In Phys. 7.1.16: “Dicendum
primum quod omnis sensus . . . sentit quod sensus sic se habet
mediante organo. quod
Cuiuslibet autem sensus organum . . . ultima completio
est ipsius organi ultima completio cuiuslibet organi est
media proportio suorum media proportio suorum
sensibilium. (Q312.27ra) sensibilium. (Q312.11ra)
18. VISION AND EXTRAMISSION
The activity or passivity of one particular sense organ—the eye—was deeply
controversial when Rufus taught. He taught just at the time when under the
77. Aristotle, DAn 2.11.424a4, ed. J. Smith (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984), p. 674.
78. Rufus, SAn, Q312.107vb.
79. Cf. Albertus, De anima 3.2.3, ed. C. Stroik, OO 7.1:178.
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influence of Alhazen’s Perspectivae, accounts of vision by extramission were
losing favor. An odd and interesting aspect of this transitional period is the
comparatively minor role played in this process by Aristotle’s views. Why?
Because, as Rufus’s works show, it was not clear to early thirteenth-century
authors that Aristotle’s views were incompatible with Augustine’s. Rufus is
an odd case here, since his views basically do not allow for extramission as
is clear from his Oxford theology lectures.80 Although, Rufus saw reasons
not to believe that extramission accounts for vision, he did not find Aristotle
explicitly denying it. Indeed some of his contemporaries found passages in
which Aristotle seemed to be committed to extramission, as in the famous
cause of menstruating women who supposedly damage mirrors by looking
at them.81
All this left Rufus in awkward position, which is reflected both in his De
anima commentary and in his Oxford theology lectures. Although intramis-
sion always plays the greater role, Rufus claims that Aristotle does not
contradict Augustine, and both extramission and intramission occur.
In DAn 3.11: melius est . . dicere aerem medium pati et immutari a
figura et colore . . . quam dicere visum fieri per repercussionem ra-
diorum visualium. . . . Et intelligendum quod Aristoteles non intendit negare
exitum radiorum ab oculis sed solum intendit quod per huiusmodi radios non
fit visus in actu. (MA. 393–94)
SOx 2.23: visio corporalis fit extramittendo secundum Augustinum.
Posset autem oculus emittere radio . . . Respondetur ad haec, quod
visio corporalis fit non extra oculi pupillam radios mittendo, sed intus
suscipiendo a re visa . . . Mihi videtur quod videre fit utroque modo, et
quod hoc intendat Philosophus. Et hoc non est contra Augustinum
(B62.158ra–rb).
80. Rufus, SOx 1.15: “Vides ergo pro parte in his intentionem Augustini,
scilicet quod oculus videt et patitur ubi non est . . . Et vides etiam quod iste ponit
videre in extramittendo, sicut posuit Plato, et contra Aristotelem, ut videtur.
“Sed quid vocat istum visum qui foris egreditur? Nunquid est aliquid de sub-
stantia ipsius animae? Nullo modo videtur. Et mihi videtur quod hanc ‘vim igneam’
quam hic vocat sensum vocavit visum’ in libro De quantitate animae, cum ait superius
“visus sentit” etc.
Sed quid istud? Nihil tale videtur posse adaptare in anima intellectiva cum
intelligit rem distantem. Similiter cum amat, nam nihil potest hic inveniri quod
exeat de ipsa anima et progrediatur usque ad rem distantem. Nam etsi dicat quod
ipsa intentio animae extenditur usque ad illam rem, nihil est hoc. Nam operatio
aliqua animae est illa intentio, et non est operatio absque operante nec absque
virtute a qua egreditur operatio, nec est virtus praeter essentiam cuius est virtus”
(B62.50rb).
81. Aristot., De somno 2.450b27–30. Anon., In DAn 2.14, ed. Gauthier, pp.
322–24.
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Cited by Albertus Magnus in his Summa de homine as the view of some
moderns, this is an awkward position at best, and it cannot have been
common.82
19. ALL SENSIBLES REDUCED TO LIGHT
20. VISION AS THE PARADIGMATIC SENSE
Part of the reason Augustine’s adherence to extramission theory was so
troubling to Rufus was the central role played by vision in Rufus’s account
of sensation. As we saw earlier, everything acts in virtue of the nature of
light. As a consequence, Rufus holds that all sensibles as such have a
common root — namely light.
DMet 8.16: Et In DAn 2.8.2: Ad hoc
ex hoc posset faciliter responderi
patet uno quodam supposito,
quod omnia scilicet quod omnia
sensibilia radicantur in una radice, sensibilia radicantur
scilicet in natura lucis. in luce tanquam in una radice.
(Q290.26va) (Q312.24ra)
Hence all the particular senses receive light in some extended sense, and
that light alters the sensory organs so that they represent sensible species.
This sort of light in turn transforms the common sense.
In DAn 2.15.4: Lux igitur sub ,in MA. hac dispositione adveniens ipsi
organo, quia reperit in ipso organo aliquid ,aliud E. simile et eius-
dem naturae cum ipsa ,ipso MA., quia ultima ,*ultima comple-
tio]ultimam completionem E. organi, immutat ipsum organum ipsi
repraesentans speciem sensibilem receptam. Haec etiam lux sit quasi
terminata ,unita MA. ipso ,ipsi MA. sensibili quod detulit ad organum
ipsius sensus particularis, per viam ductam ab ipso organo usque ad
organum sensus communis transiens, et ibi scilicet in organo sensus
communis sibi simile, id est aliquid eiusdem naturae reperiens ut
naturam lucis quae est ultima completio illius ,ipsius MA. organi
citra ,circa MA. animam, per hoc quod sic tingitur immutat ipsum
organum sensus communis. Sic igitur intelligendum quod omnia sensi-
bilia communicant in natura lucis, scilicet non tanquam in aliquo quod
sit de eorum essentia, sed tanquam in aliquo per quod omnia sensibilia
,om. MA. immutant ,immutent MA. ipsos ,proprios (pos. sensus)
MA. sensus. (MA 279, Q312.26va)
So, according to Rufus, all the senses can be reduced in a certain sense to
the sense of vision.
82. Albertus M., Summa de homine 22, ed. Borgnet, 35:223.
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DMet 8.16: Et etiam ex dicto patet quod omne sensibile est visibile
quodammodo et omnes sensus quodammodo sensus visus. Et hoc quia
omnes communicant naturam lucis quae maxime appropriatur sensui
visui. (Q290.26va)
21. AGENT INTELLECT ACTS LIKE AN EXTERNAL LIGHT
For Rufus, the analogy Aristotle draws between light and the agent intellect
is a controlling metaphor, to which he frequently refers, calling it an
“exemplum conveniens.” Just as the species of color cannot be seen without
external light, so the agent intellect makes imaginables actually intelligible
or ideas actual. Light combines with air, as the agent combines with the
possible intellect, to produce a seen or understood species. In the quotation
which follows, the intelligible species is also described as the intellectus
adeptus.
In DAn 3.3.3: Et exemplum conveniens est ,ant. exemplum MA. si ex aere
et luce recepta in ipso ,ipsa MA. constaret unum individuum—ut,
scilicet, aer esset eius materia; lux vero ipsius formae subtilis—posset
hoc individuum convenienter assimulari intelligentiae creatae antequam
infundatur corpori. Similiter est in anima: quod enim recipitur in anima
assimulatur speciei coloris et est intellectus adeptus. Quod autem re-
cipit sive intellectus ,canc. E. possibilis assimulatur aeri. Intellectus
autem agens assimulatur ,om. MA. luci. Et sicut praesentia lucis super
colorem facit de colore exsistente in potentia sensibili actu sensibile
,sensibilem MA., similiter praesentia intellectus agentis sive formae
ipsius animae super imaginabile facit de hoc imaginabili actu intelligibile.
(MA. 328, Q312.27va–vb)
Both in Contra Averroem and in In De anima, the necessity of an external light
to illuminate color is likened to the need for the agent intellect to illumi-
nate the species received by the possible intellect.
CAv 1: Et nonne hoc consonat Philosopho dicenti intellectus agens
facit universalitatem in rebus—hoc est, abstrahit ideam ab obiecto et
eam ad esse actuale perducit. In obiecto enim ipso ,natura E. non
videtur idea habere esse nisi potentiale. Ibi enim non est nisi ipsa
natura, et forte huius est ,s. lin. E. conveniens exemplum de colore in
materia qui de se non est sufficienter ,sufficiens E. potens gignere vel
multiplicare sui speciem in medio, nisi prius a luce exteriore move-
atur. . . . in praedictis patet de colore in materia quod non movet nisi
prius luce exteriore sit ,om. E. illuminatus.
Sed dubito: si hoc quod intellectus causatus recipiens et idea recepta
unum sunt in actu, hoc est forte per exemplum in rebus corporalibus,
sicut ex aere et lumine vel luce fit vere unum, et est lucidum vere
medium. (Q312.83vb–84rb)
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22. NON NATURAL SENSIBLES AND INTELLIGIBLES
The proximate object of human understanding, intelligible species, are non
natural forms. Unlike natural forms which shape composites in the external
world, ideas or species unite with the intellect to produce understanding.
In DAn 3.2.3: Ergo essentia ipsius aquae absolvitur a dictis condi-
cionibus materialibus quamvis non secundum suum esse naturale. . . . Et
propterea convenienter dicit quod aliter intelligitur aqua quam esse
naturale ipsius. (MA. 320, Q312.27rb)
CAv 1.9: Et numquid sic ei inest in quantum et propter hoc quod ipsum
est idea et species sola et non natura causata vel ens? Et vide quod etsi idea
sit una numero nata sic esse in pluribus simul et semel, non tamen
ubique neque in omni, sed in materia sibi propria, intellectu scilicet
recipiente. (Q312.83ra)
Referring as he subsequently does in his Speculum animae to “species
forms” is new, but distinguishing natural from spiritual being is not. Rufus
borrows the phrase “esse spirituale” from Averroes to describe the subtle and
immaterial essences characteristic of species present both in the medium
through which they pass and the senses.83
SAn 2: Dicis ergo quod sensibile in obiecto extra habet esse accidentis;
in medio vel organo, nec accidentis nec substantiae, quia iterum aliter
distinguimus esse scilicet naturae et speciei. Et haec est distinctio perutilis et
necessaria. (Q312.108rb)
In DAn 2.12.6: Sed aliter est in sensitivis; illud enim quod agit in sensum
est forma non materialiter exsistens sed in esse spirituali in medio et in
organo. Et propter hoc potest immutare animam sensitivam quae in-
corporea est. (MA. 250, Q312.25vb)
However, the use of this distinction to explain why some forms are
sensed and others are not is characteristic of Rufus.84 In In DAn, Rufus
explains why the sensitive but not the vegetative soul perceives by distin-
guishing between spiritual and material beings. We perceive things as they
exist spiritually and are received in our senses, but not when they are
present materially in the organs of the vegetative soul.
In DAn 2.5: Dicendum quod omne organum virtutis sensitivae est
quaedam media proportio omnium suorum sensibilium spiritualiter
83. Averroes, In DAn 2.97: “illud est esse corporale et hoc spirituale, et illud
naturale et hoc extraneum” (ed. F. Crawford, p. 277).
84. I owe this point to discussions with Calvin Normore, who dealt with the
problem in the paper he gave at Bonn in August 2000 entitled “Richard Rufus and
the immateriality of the Intellect.”
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exsistentium, et propterea immutatur organum per sensibile iam spiri-
tualiter exsistens. . . . . Sed organum sive subiectum virtutis vegetativae
est aliqua proportio contrariorum materialiter exsistentium, sicut
aliquod corpus vere complexionatum in quantum huiusmodi, et prop-
terea forma immutans hoc organum immutat ipsum materialiter et in
ipso reperitur materialiter et non spiritualiter. Et propterea istam immuta-
tionem non percipit anima. (Q312.23va)
In his Speculum animae, Rufus tells us that prime matter does not perceive
the forms it receives, because it receives only natural forms, not species or
ideas:
In DAn 2.5: Et quid de tertia quaestione doces, quare materia prima
non comprehendat. Si esset nata recipere ideam obiecti, intelligeret.
Sed non est; solum enim rem et naturam recipit . . . Et hoc est quod materia
prima recipit et non recipit speciem vel intentionem illius qualitatis sensibi-
lis. Et ideo materia non sentit. (Q312.84vb)
As Calvin Normore pointed out in a recent talk, distinguising between
natural and non natural forms enabled Rufus to avoid a common scholastic
problem. Aquinas and many others had to explain how one and the same
form could both inform the intellect and shape external objects.
23. THE AGENT INTELLECT HAS ALL INTELLIGIBLES
To fit it for the task of abstracting species and illuminating the possible
intellect, from the time of its creation, the agent intellect has all intelligibles
In APos 1: anima rationalis ex creatione sua habet omnia intelligibilia . . . Ha-
bet ergo haec ratio veritatem quoad hoc quod ponit animam ex sua
creatione omnia intelligere. (Q312.30ra)
In DAn 3.3.3: lux vero ipsius formae subtilis posset hoc individuum
convenienter assimulari intelligentiae creatae antequam infundatur
corpori. Si igitur hoc individuum possit ,posset MA. cognoscere suam
formam—scilicet, lucem, quia in ipsa luce est natura omnium colorum,
in ipsa sua forma complete cognosceret omnes colores. Similiter anima
in cognoscendo suam formam, eo quod in ipsa forma sunt quasi vestigia
formarum omnium, . . . intelligit omnia. Sed hoc—scilicet, quod in forma
ipsius animae vel ,aut MA. etiam in forma alicuius intelligentiae
reluceant ,relucent MA. formae omnium—non est nisi in quantum
participat formam superiorem—scilicet, primam. (MA. 328,
Q312.27va–vb)
DMet 7: intellectus qui est agens, qui est pars animae nostrae, omnia et
semper intelligit actu. (Q290.21vb)
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SOx 1.14: Sed intelligibilia . . . videtur anima secum naturaliter habere et in
exordio suae creationis suscepisse et semper illorum scientiam habere.
(B62.48ra)
Some of Rufus contemporaries, by contrast, claimed for the agent
intellect only a partial grasp of intelligibles.85
24. THE AGENT INTELLECT IS PART OF THE HUMAN SOUL
Not only does agent intellect always have all intelligibles from the time of
its creation, but it is a part of the human soul. What Aristotle’s position on
this topic was is still controverted today. In the early thirteenth century, if
Roger Bacon is to be believed, most major theologians and ecclesiatical
authorities denied this claim.86 Admittedly, it is hard to know just how
common or uncommon Rufus’s view was. But the claim that the agent
intellect was a separated substance had the backing of Avicenna and the
bishop of Paris, William of Auvergne.87 For most of his career, Roger Bacon
followed Avicenna, as did Adam Buckfield and Albert the Great,88 so it is
significant to find clear statements of the view that the agent intellect is part
of the human intellect in Rufus’s works. Attributing the view to Aristotle and
stating it hypothetically are probably signs that Rufus considered the posi-
tion controversial:
DMet 7: Ad hoc dicendum quod si intellectus agens sit intra et pars
animae, non tamen quaecumque intelligit intellectus agens intelligit
homo in hac vita. (Q312.21va)
In DAn 3.3.2: illae ,istae MA. differentiae, agens et ,om. MA. possi-
bile, sunt in ipsa anima secundum Aristotelem. Sic enim arguit: In omni re
naturali est reperire in eodem genere aliquid agens et aliquid patiens
et aliquid quod sit in ipso patiente per agens, ergo in anima est invenire
haec tria. (MA.326, Q312.27va)
However, Rufus never considers objections against this position. Through-
out his discussion of De anima 3.5, he consistently assumes an internal, but
85. Summa Halesiana 2.372, 2.1:452.
86. According to J. McEvoy, Bacon is wrong about Grosseteste. And Bacon
seems to have mistated William of Auvergne’s position. Given his unreliabiity as a
witness, it is not reassuring to find that he is the only witness to Adam Marsh’s
position on this subject. Cf. J. McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, Oxford
1982, pp. 346–351.
87. Avicenna, Liber de prima philosophia 9.3, ed. S. van Riet, 2:476. Idem, Liber
DAn 5.6, ed. S. van Riet, 1: 71. Cf. etiam Avicenna, Liber de prima philosophia 9.3, ed.
S. van Riet, 2:476. Auvergne, Magisterium, “De universo,” 1.2.13–16, Opera Omnia,
Paris 1674 5 OO 1:820–823.
88. T. Crowley, Roger Bacon: the Problem of the Soul in His Philosophical Commen-
taries, Louvain 1950, p. 165, 184. E. Gilson, “Pourquoi St. Thomas a critiqué St.
Augustin,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age 1 (1942), 80–111.
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separable agent intellect. Near the end of his arts career he states the claim
explicitly:
DMet 11: Dicendum quod uterque—scilicet, intellectus agens et possibi-
lis—est intra et isti sunt intellectus unius et eiusdem secundum substan-
tiam et subiectum. (Q290.35rb)
25. HUMANS DO NOT HAVE THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE AGENT INTELLECT
Though the agent intellect is human not divine, and it always understands
all intelligibles, we do not have such understanding. The agent’s under-
standing is not human understanding.
In DAn 3.3: illud intelligere est ipsius animae secundum quod est in se
substantia incorporea et debetur intellectui agenti, tamquam efficienti per
quem anima hoc intellectu semper intelligit, quod intelligere non est
ipsius hominis. (MA. 323)
In DAn 3.3. Item, anima hominis est aliquod individuum creatum et
infusum. . . . per hoc quod continuatur cum imaginatione privatur sive caret
ipsis intelligibilibus. (MA.327, Q312.27va)
DMet 7: Ad hoc dicendum quod si intellectus agens sit intra et pars
animae, non tamen quaecumque intelligit intellectus agens intelligit
homo in hac vita. (Q312.21va)
Many of Rufus’s contemporaries—men such as Bacon, Albert, and many of
their predecessors—claimed for us the knowledge of the agent intellect.89
By contrast, Rufus held that in this life, the knowledge of the agent intellect
is not accessible to us; rather it is present to humans as latent or habitual
understanding.
APos 1: anima rationalis . . . ex coniunctione sui cum corpore eadem
retinebit licet non considerabit. Sed demonstratio facit ipsam consider-
are quod latenter habet. (Q312.30ra)
SOx 1.14: Sed intelligibilia . . . videtur anima secum naturaliter habere
. . . et semper illorum scientiam habere—in habitu, dico. Et similiter illa
89. T. Crowley, Roger Bacon: the Problem of the Soul in His Philosophical Commen-
taries (Louvain: Éditions de I’Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1950), p. 189.
Albertus M., Sent. 1.17.4, ed. A. Borgnet, 25:472.
Philippus C., Summa de bono, De bono nature A.4.6, ed. N. Wicki, p. 271.
Rupella, Summa de anima 2.37, ed. T. Domenichelli, pp. 292–93. De potentiis animae,
ed. D. Callus, “The Powers of the Soul,” Recherhes de theologie ancienne et mèdièvale 29
(1952): 156. R. Gauthier, “Le traitè anima et de potenciis eius,” Revue des science
philosophiques et thèologiques 66 (1982):18.
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intelligere, non tamen semper illa cogitare, hoc est actu considerare.
(B62.48ra)
Indeed, the aim of human learning is to be perfectly conjoined with the
operation of the agent intellect.
DMet 7: Et quia intellectus qui est agens qui est pars animae nostrae
omnia et semper intelligit actu, ideo nostrum addiscere est tendere ad
perfectam coniunctionem operationum intellectus agentis in ipso homine. Ex
hoc patet quod multa videt illa pars animae quae non videt homo.
(Q290.21vb)
2. DISAGREEMENTS ON DOCTRINE
There are also, quite typically for Rufus, differences in views. Most are
cases of novel and important developments in Rufus’s thought not re-
flected in his early philosophical works. For example, in the De anima
commentary Rufus denies that the soul and its operations are identical, a
claim he came to accept fifteen years later as we will see below.90 Rufus
was able to make this change only as a result of carefully developing his
position on formal predication. Those views allowed him to claim real
identity in the soul without interfering with the special prerogatives of
divine unity. Similarly, in In DAn, Rufus found himself unable to affirm
the complete substantial identity of the agent and possible intellects, such
that they differ only in mode of existence.91 But in DMet, he accepted this
claim.92 Here again the formal distinction probably played a role. Note,
too, that Rufus’s position was much more qualified than many of his suc-
cessors.93 Rufus continued to describe agent intellect as a part of the
intellect, not simply as another name for the whole, which means that he
still had reservations concerning the degree of identity that obtained be-
tween the agent and possible intellects.
Many disagreements between In De anima and the later works have to
do with controversial theses stated and developed for the first time in
90. Rufus, In DAn 3.2: “Ergo illud quod intelligit et illud quo intelligit sunt
idem in ipso intellectu. Hoc autem in omni intellectu intelligente impossible est
preter quam solum intelligente primo; ergo intellectus non intelligitur ,!. per se
ipsum et patet quod per aliquam formam sive speciem in eo intelligitur” (MA. 317).
Rufus, SOx 1.1M is quoted below.
91. Rufus, In DAn 3.3.3: “Dicendum quod non penitus idem secundum sub-
stantiam est intellectus agens et possibilis secundum esse diversa” (MA. 327,
Q312.27va).
92. Rufus, DMet 11: “Et ita intellectus possibilis et intellectus agens sunt unius
et eadem et idem intellectus licet unus sit in potentia et alterum actu” (Q290.35rb).
93. Anon., In DAn 3.2 q.5, ed. R. Gauthier, p. 469–70.
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Rufus’s Contra Averroem. They are (1) that the intellect understands not just
similitudes, but divine ideas themselves,94 (2) that it is these divine ideas
which are universals properly speaking, though they are predicable only of
themselves,95 and (3) that form not matter plays the decisive role in indi-
viduation.96 There are no traces of these views in Rufus’s In De anima, but
that is not surprising. None of Rufus’s early philosophical works defend
these radical ideas. In his early philosophical works, Rufus seeks to under-
stand and improve on Aristotle, as if to improve on the consistency of his
Aristotelianism, but not to challenge his authority. At the end of his philo-
sophical career, just before he became a Franciscan, Rufus shows a strong
sympathy with Plato and repudiates ‘exculpatory’ interpretations of Aris-
totle.97
These dramatic cases represent major developments in Rufus’s think-
ing, breaks not just with general scholarly opinion but with his own views,
which are often painfully considered and reconsidered, in treatises specially
written for the purpose, with multiple arguments pro and contra. It is not
surprising to find no reflection of such positions in an early work.
3. CONCLUSION REGARDING THE ATTRIBUTION
Richard Rufus of Cornwall is the author of the De anima commentary found
in Erfurt 312 and Madrid 3314. There is no scarcity of verbal resemblance,
shared technical terminology, and characteristic, even unique positions
stated in Rufus’s De anima commentary and his other works. The many
shared views include theses stated by no other author. Particularly notewor-
thy are Rufus’s position on local motion which continues when contact is
lost and his use and development of a theory of formal predication. Taken
together the views common to In DAn and Rufus’s other works demonstrate
a distinctive and coherent philosophical perspective.
Most parallels to the De anima (In DAn) commentary come from Rufus’s
other early commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics, Metaphysics (MMet), and
94. In the De anima commentary, we understand species which are mere
similitudes, and this is true even when we understand ourselves. By contrast, in
Rufus’s later Contra Averroem, the description of self-knowledge is complicated and
tentative, and the very unusual claim is made that we understand not merely specific
similitudes but the very essences or ideas of things. See Rufus, In DAn 3.2, MA.317,
as quoted above. Cf. CAv 1, Q312.83va).
95. See “Richard Rufus and the Classical Tradition,” in Neoplatonisme et philoso-
phie médièvale, ed. L. Benakis, Rencontres de philosophie médièvale 6, (Turnhout:
Brepols, 1997), pp. 229–51. Cf. Rufus, In DAn 3.3, MA. 330–31, Q312.28ra.
96. R. Wood, “Individual Forms,” in John Duns Scotus, ed. L. Honnefelder, R.
Wood, and M. Dreyer (Leiden: Brill, 1996), pp. 251–72. Cf. Rufus, In DAn 3.3, MA.
331, Q312.28ra.
97. Rufus, DMet 11.6, ed. T. Noone, “An Edition,” p. 180.
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Posterior analytics (In APos)—above all with the closely related Physics com-
mentary. But there are also parallels with the late philosophical works (his
Contra Averroem and DMet, his second Metaphysics commentary) and the
theological works (Speculum animae [SAn] and the Oxford lectures on Lom-
bard). There is even a characteristic self-reference from the Oxford lec-
tures. Taken together with the manuscript evidence, and the similarities in
genre and citation style, what we know about Rufus’s views in his De anima
commentary as compared with his other works, permits confidence in the
attribution.
4. DATING
The principal dating tool we have, evidence from an early chronicle on the
date Rufus became a Franciscan, 1238, is of limited use. It indicates only
that the philosophical works are before 1238 and the theological works
thereafter. We do not know when Rufus began lecturing as an Arts master;
we can only loosely estimate the dates of his lectures. Even the relative
dating of the philosophical works is challenging, since Rufus so seldom cites
himself. The few clear cases are as follows: the second Metaphysics commen-
tary cites Contra Averroem and the Physics commentary, which in turn cites
the earliest Metaphysics commentary, Rufus’s Memoriale.
Changes in doctrine provide another key to relative dating. As we saw,
prior to Contra Averroem, Rufus held that the most important cause of
individuation was matter, signate matter, a position defended in Rufus’s
Memoriale.98 That early position is reflected in Rufus’s Physics and De anima
commentaries.99 So both these works are prior to Contra Averroem.
In Contra Averroem, Rufus also changed his position on species. No
longer are they described just as similitudes but as most specific similitudes,
a degree of likeness made possible by participation in the divine. On this
issue, too, neither In Phys.100 nor In DAn states the mature position; indeed,
a strong defense of the earlier position is found in In DAn.101 Stated by
reference to supersimilar, most express, and immaterial similitudes, the
98. Rufus, MMet 7.11, Q290.49ra.
99. Rufus, In Phys. 2.8.1: “ . . . lux non posset numerare sive multiplicare se
sine diapano extra ipsam recipiente . . . luces receptae comparentur formae indi-
viduatae et multiplicatae per materiam” (Q312.4vb).”
Rufus, In DAn 3.3.6: “uno modo est multiplicabilis ,numerabilis MA. et
divisibilis, scilicet per materiam” (MA. 331, Q312.28ra). But note that though Rufus
does not challenge this claim, it is not stated in his own name.
100. Cf. Rufus, In Phys. 7.1.16, Q312.11ra.
101. Rufus, In DAn 3.5, MA. 329–31, Q312.27vb–28ra.
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mature position appears only in late philosophical works and early theologi-
cal works.102
Describing identity and difference in terms of the formal distinction
reflects another change of opinion, this time by gradual development
rather than by radically revising early views. A comparison of Rufus’s very
early Memoriale in Metaph. with his Oxford theology lectures shows how in
discussions of the question whether acting and being acted upon can be the
same thing, the Aristotelian distinction between what is the same secundum
substantiam but different secundum rationem developed into the formal dis-
tinction.103 In this case, we find the earlier distinction in the Physics com-
mentary104 and the later (as well as the earlier) distinction in the De anima
commentary.105 So it seems reasonable to suppose that the Physics commen-
tary was written before the De anima.
102. Rufus, SAn Q312.108rb.
Rufus, DMet 7.7: “Sed ipsa [species] non est immaterialis nisi per participa-
tionem formae quae simpliciter est immaterialis. Igitur qui eam cognoscit, oportet
ut cognoscat eam in quantum participat immaterialitatem eius quod est simpliciter
immateriale, et hoc est causa prima. Oportet igitur ut cognoscat causam primam ad
hoc ut cognoscat eam, et patet sic consequentia.
Alio modo sic: omnis natura causata quae quantum est de se et in se est
intelligibilis habeat speciem sive similitudinem per quam est intelligibilis sive nata
intelligi. Species autem alicuius naturae habet esse spirituale quod non habet suum
obiectum extra; ipsum enim non potest immediate recipi in intellectu; illa autem
species est immaterialis et est aliquid sui obiecti a quo gignitur. Unde ipsum
obiectum ratione illius ,?. est immateriale. Cum igitur quaelibet natura causata
habeat talem speciem, quaelibet natura causata erit aliquo modo immaterialis, sed
non potest esse immaterialis sed per participationem primae causae. Igitur ad hoc
ut sciatur ipsa, oportet ut sciatur causa prima” (Q290.14va).
103. Rufus, MMet 11.6: “Vel potest dici alio modo quod sicut actio et passio
idem sunt secundum substantiam et magis habent esse in patiente ut in subiecto, et
solum differunt secundum rationem, similiter causa et causatum idem sunt et una
relatio in subiecto, differunt tamen in ratione” (Q290.53ra–rb).
Cf. Rufus, SOx proem.: “Num video quod actio et passio una res est secundum
subiectum et substantiam, definitione tamen et praedicatione formali differunt? Sicut ait
Philosophus: ‘Sensibilis actus et sensus idem quidem est et unus, esse ipsorum non
idem’. Dico autem ut est sonus secundum actum et auditus secundum actum. Et alibi:
‘Quare similiter unus utrorumque actus’, scilicet motivi et mobilis, sicut eadem dis-
tantia unius ad duo . . . Haec quidem enim una est, ratio tamen non una” (B62.12ra).
104. Rufus, Physics 4.3.6: “In solvendo dubitationem de instanti, dicit quod
uno modo est idem, sicut secundum substantiam; alterum et alterum, secundum
rationem” (Q312.8rb).
105. Rufus, In DAn 2.10: “Dicendum ,pos. primum MA. ad primum quod
cum dicit gustabile esse quoddam tangibile, haec ,hoc MA. non est omnino per
se, ita quod subiectum et praedicatum sint idem ut sit formalis ,formaliter MA.
praedicatio, nec est omnino per accidens, ut hoc visibile sive color est quoddam
tangibile; color enim ita per accidens est tangibile quod tangibile secundum tangi-
bile nihil confert ad hoc quod color sit visibile. Gustabile autem est ita tangibile
quod tangibile aliquid confert ad hoc quod sit gustabile; humidum enim secundum
quod tangibile est est materia tangibilis. Unde est quasi causalis praedicatio, et sic
est aliquo modo per se” (MA. 217–18, Q312.24rb–va).
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That suggests the following chronological sequence for the philosophi-
cal works. Rufus lectured first on the Metaphysics and the Physics, then on De
anima, and finally after composing his Contra Averroem, for a second time on
the Metaphysics.106
Is Rufus’s De anima commentary the earliest Western commentary?
Alonso thought that the work he edited was the earliest. J. Brams stated a
similar view at a conference in Bonn in August 2000. R. Gauthier doubted
the claim, neither affirming nor denying it. Specifically, he thought that
there were enough references to earlier opinions to show that the commen-
tary could have been part of a Western commentary tradition, in which
early maladroit Arts masters participated.107 There are, as Alonso pointed
out, not many contemporary references—a total of four in the Erfurt
questions, which is one less than was once thought.108 These are references
to opinions about whether the agent intellect is human or divine, why men
seem to have an appetite for things which are not good, and in what manner
sense and intellect can err. Clearly such problems concerned authors who
were not engaged in teaching De anima, so it is entirely possible that we have
a record of the first lectures on De anima.
We cannot explain the infrequency of contemporary reference by
suggesting that Rufus was an author who preferred not to consider and
acknowledge contemporary opinion. In his theological works, Rufus
quoted contemporary opinion at length.
Nor does it seem right to conclude from the condemnations of 1210
that Arts masters had already begun commenting on De anima, since these
condemnations seem to have been aimed at authors who neither com-
mented on nor taught the libri naturales.
Was Rufus’s De anima commentary a record of thirteenth-century
teaching? R. Gauthier believes it was not, since new passages are often
introduced with the words “Hic intendit,” rather than with phrases like
“Consequenter cum dicit.”109 Here we should note first that there are some
such phrases—the appearance of transitional phrases such as “Consequenter
dubitatur,” “Consequenter quaeritur,” and “Consequenter subiungit” may be
the result of oral delivery.110 Moreover, texts not introduced by words and
phrases like ‘consequenter,’ ‘postea,’ or ‘cum iam,’ but begun simply with “Hic
106. About the commentaries on De generatione et corruptione and Anal. pos.
doubts about dating remain. But it seems likely that In APos preceeded and In DGen
followed the Physics commentary.
107. Aquinas, Sent. DAn, ed. R. Gauthier, 45.1:238*.
108. What Alonso read as “Propter hoc poterit aliquis dicere” (MA.198) reads
correctly in Erfurt: “Propterea poterit aliter dici” (Q312.24ra).
109. Aquinas, Sent, DAn, ed. R. Gauthier, 45.1:238*.
110. Rufus, In DAn 2.11, Q312.25rb; 2.12, MA.246. In DAn 3.3: “Consequenter
subiungit rationem . . . Hic subiungit secundum rationem ad idem . . . Consequen-
ter manifestat dictam diffinitionem . . . Consequenter subiungit signum . . . Conse-
quenter subiungit . . .” (MA. 308–329).
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incipit” or “In ista parte intendit” are also found in Rufus’s Dissertatio in
Metaph. Aristot., a work which is clearly divided into lectiones.111 Parts of
Rufus’s Physics commentary also sometimes open by saying what they are
intended to determine, rather than what the author has said or will say next,
and it too refers explicitly to a previous “lectio.”112 The De anima commentary
clearly belongs to the same series, so there is every reason to believe that at
least part of it is a record of classroom teaching. But this question is
complicated by the double redactions in which Rufus’s commentaries some-
times survive. It may be that some parts of the commentary were, as Gauth-
ier suggests, not delivered orally.
Even supposing, as seems right to do, that Rufus’s De anima commen-
tary was a result of his teaching activity, we do not know who was the first to
teach the work. And we are even less likely to learn when the Western
written tradition of glossing or commenting on De anima began. What we
can say with confidence is that Rufus’s is the earliest known surviving,
Western De anima commentary.
111. T. Noone, “An Edition and Study of the Scriptum super Metaphysiciam, bk.
12, dist. 2: A Work Attributed to Richard Rufus of Cornwall” (Ph.D. diss. University
of Toronto, 1987).
112. Rufus, In Phys. 8.3.3.: “in fine lectionis nostrae” (Q312.13vb).
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